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ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the integration between Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Inertial Naviga-
tion System (INS) from an integrity perspective. In order to
achieve this, we analyze a low-complex coupling scheme,
where a GNSS layer resets the INS strapdown algorithm
with position, velocity and their respective protection lev-
els. In particular, RAIM and Velocity RAIM algorithms are
used here as the integrity-based core system. Special fo-
cus is dedicated to the propagation of uncertainties in terms
of covariances through the strapdown inertial algorithm, as
well as the impact of the reset uncertainties and accelerom-
eter noise on the final computed protection levels. Finally,
it is shown how our integrated system may solve the con-
tinuity and availability problems of GNSS by coasting not
only the position solution but also the protection levels.
1 INTRODUCTION
In civil aviation, it is considered that the probability to
have a navigation error larger than a specified Alert Limit
(AL) should remain below 10−7 or even below 10−9 for
CAT III precision approach [1]. For stand-alone satellite
navigation systems, it is a tremendous challenge to achieve
these requirements due to a large variety of ranging error
sources [2] and possible weak geometries that may badly
affect the position accuracy.
Hence, the satellite navigation community has developed
augmentation systems and integrity monitoring algorithms
to guarantee the performance for a given phase of flight,
e.g., Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) [3],
Ground Based Augmentation Systems (GBAS) [4] and Air-
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borne Based Augmentation Systems (ABAS) like the Re-
ceiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) [5, 3, 6,
7]. All these augmentation systems use the notion of pro-
tection levels to define position bounds at given integrity
risk values. This integrity metric assumes nominal behav-
ior of each ranging source provided that abnormal ranging
errors are detected reliably, i.e., with a very low probability
of missed detection.
Additionally to the integrity, a continuity requirement
needs also to be fulfilled. The continuity requirement as
defined for example in [1] and [3] includes: the probability
to lose the navigation solution (e.g., due to radio frequency
interference causing a drop in the number of visible satel-
lites below the minimum number of four); the probability
that an integrity monitor flags the GNSS solution (or a criti-
cal number of ranging sources); and the probability that the
provided protection level is larger than the required alert
limit during a given period of time.
In this paper, we consider the use of Inertial Reference Sys-
tems (IRS) to coast a guaranteed position solution during a
loss of GNSS continuity. The idea of coasting GNSS po-
sition solution during a GNSS outage is not new and inte-
grated system solutions can be already found on the mar-
ket. Their level of accuracy achieved is fully acceptable
for outages not exceeding a few minutes with navigation or
tactical grade inertial units. But guaranteeing the integrity
of the navigation solution during the coasting phase is very
challenging and necessitate a generalization of the legacy
concept of integrity.
In order to address the integrity problem, this work consid-
ers a simple integration of a GNSS and an Inertial Navi-
gation System (INS), i.e., the stand-alone GNSS solution
is taken whenever it is available with sufficient integrity,
and stand-alone inertial-based navigation solution is cho-
sen during a discontinuity of the GNSS service. The pro-
tection level of the integrated solution is defined as follows:
when the GNSS service is available, we take the protec-
tion level provided by a ranging domain RAIM consider-
ing only one possible satellite outage at a time. During the
coasting phase, we assume generalized inertial error mod-
els. We estimate the sensor errors propagation during the
strap-down process and scale the position and velocity error
bounds (protection levels) to the corresponding integrity
risk quantiles.
The paper is organized as follows: We first present the
GNSS-aided INS integrity concept, then in a second part
we briefly recall the GNSS integrity concept including a
position and velocity RAIM based protection levels. In a
third part we present the strap-down INS uncertainty prop-
agation as well as a proof of the protection levels coasting
concept in a real scenario. Finally conclusion with pro-
posed directions of a future work close this paper.
Fig. 1 GNSS-aided INS integration scheme using GNSS
based position, velocity and integrity information as iner-
tial reset.
2 GNSS-AIDED INS INTEGRITY CONCEPT
As it has been mentioned before, the overbound of
the pseudoranges errors and its characterization has been
widely studied for the GNSS system [8, 9, 2]. However for
an integrated INS/GNSS system, the integrity problem is
still an open question. In the community, a great effort has
been dedicated to improve the accuracy of an integrated
INS/GNSS system, i.e., many sophisticated methods and
filters have been proposed and designed to enhance the sys-
tem accuracy [10, 11]. However, all these algorithms are
very difficult to analyze in terms of integrity due to the re-
quired linearization assumptions in inertial [12] and result-
ing temporal error correlations.
Similar to [13], we encounter the INS/GNSS problem
from the integrity perspective. For this purpose, we choose
a simple coupling scheme that enables us to assess the in-
tegrity of the whole system, even if it is not the optimal
method in terms of accuracy. As seen in Fig. 1, the GNSS
integrity layer not only provides a position and velocity so-
lution as usual, but also the associated integrity information
in terms of protection levels. This information is used to
reset both the strapdown inertial system as well as the iner-
tial integrity assessment. If no GNSS integrity information
is available, the reset is not performed. Consequently, the
reset values used in the inertial guarantee the required in-
tegrity requirements such as probability of false alarm and
the integrity risk.
In order to provide the required GNSS integrity infor-
mation of the position and velocity, RAIM [8] and veloc-
ity RAIM [14] are considered. In Fig. 2, the corresponding
block diagram of the full system is displayed. As it can be
seen, the GNSS works completely independent of the INS,
i.e., there is neither feedback information to the GNSS nor
in the strapdown algorithm. This allow us to analyze the
nominal system error behavior in a formal way and propa-
gate the uncertainties through the integration process.
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Fig. 2 GNSS-aided INS integration scheme using RAIM
and velocity RAIM as GNSS integrity source.
3 GNSS INTEGRITY LAYER
In this section we discuss briefly the applied RAIM and
Velocity RAIM algorithms. Additionally, we expose how
the protection levels are adapted to the covariance matrix,
which are used to reset the inertial system.
3.1 Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM)
RAIM is a user-level integrity scheme that has been ex-
tensively investigated as long as GNSS has been used for
integrity-related applications such as guidance for aircraft.
It is based on exploiting that the least-squares system of
equations is over-determined. This is the case when the
number of satellites is larger than the dimension of the
state vector to be estimated. With more observations being
present than unknown quantities to be resolved, RAIM can
check the consistency of the measurements with respect to
a particular solution.
In this work, we apply the weighted RAIM scheme in-
troduced in [8]. The following section explains merely its
concept; a complete derivation can be found in the original
paper.
Given a weighted system of N linearized equations for
the state vector x, containing the 3D position and user clock
offset estimates,
x =
(
GTWG
)−1
GTWρ , (1)
the residuals of this least squares term can be determined
with
WSSE = ρT ·W
(
I−
(
G
(
GTWG
)−1
GTW
))
· ρ .
G is the design matrix containing the line-of-sight vec-
tors, W is the inverse covariance-variance matrix of the
measurements, x is the estimate of the state vector and ρ
is the vector of range observations. The Weighted Sum
Square Error WSSE is then a scalar test statistic that ex-
presses the consistency of the measurement set at hand.
Assuming that the measurement errors are Gaussian dis-
tributed with variances σi = diag
(
W−1
)
, the distribution
of the test statistic is χ2-distributed with noncentrality pa-
rameter λ = 0 and (N − 4) degrees of freedom.
The consistency check on this test statistic is imple-
mented as a hypothesis test. It employs a nominal error
model for the observations to determine what degree of
inconsistency is considered nominal. The corresponding
threshold of the WSSE test statistic is a function of the
geometry size N and a false alert rate Pfa. If the fault hy-
pothesis is chosen, the algorithm can be used for the detec-
tion of one single range failure and its exclusion. That is
it tries to isolate a the faulty measurement by recursively
excluding measurements until a consistent subset can be
found.
Furthermore RAIM gives an estimate on the error bound
given that consistency is present. From the definition of the
threshold a noncentral χ2 distribution can be established
where its left tail below the threshold corresponds to the
permissible missed detection rate Pmd. For each observa-
tion the maximum error that leads to a test statistic at the
level of the threshold can now be determined. Again, the
nominal error model plays an important role here: It deter-
mines the test threshold for the aforementioned hypothesis
test (based on the fault free hypothesis), but also relates the
nominal variations of the non-faulted observations in the
fault case to the distribution of the test statistic.
3.2 Velocity RAIM
The same principle used for position RAIM of fault de-
tection and exclusion can be also applied for the computa-
tion of the velocity. GNSS receivers are able to measure
the Doppler shift frequency experienced by the signal, and
therefore give the information of the relative velocity (i.e.,
deltaranges) of every satellite in view with respect to the
user. Then, combining the different deltaranges for all the
satellites, it is possible to compute the velocity of the user
at the same rate as the position. A deltarange (ρ˙) can be
obtained from the Doppler measurement (D) just relating
it with the signal frequency (f ) as ρ˙ = cfD. The deltarange
measurement obtained from the Doppler shift can be ex-
pressed as:
ρ˙ =
(
nsu +
vs
c
)
· (vs − vu)− dt˙s + dt˙u + δ + ε , (2)
where nsu is the line-of-sight user-satellite vector, v
s and
vu are the satellite and user velocity respectively, dt˙s and
dt˙u are the satellite and user clock drift, δ include the rest
errors due to the atmosphere, Sagnac effect and eccentricity
of the Earth and ε is the remaining noise. As in most cases
the remaining noise is bigger than the other errors, δ is here
considered negligible.
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Combining all the measurements from the satellites in
view, we end up with the following system:
∆ρ˙ = G
(
vu
−dt˙u
)
− ε , (3)
where ∆ρ˙ is the measured deltarange minus the expected
relative velocity given the satellite velocity and the drift of
the satellite clock, and G is the same geometric matrix used
to solve the position solution. The weighted solution of the
system is computed as follows:
(
vu
−dt˙u
)
=
(
GTW∆ρ˙G
)−1
GTW∆ρ˙∆ρ˙ , (4)
where the weighted matrix W∆ρ˙ is the inverse of the
covariance of the velocity residuals. This covariance not
only depends on the actual noise statistics of the deltarange
measurements but also depends on the position covariance
since the line-of-sight vector is needed to compute the ve-
locity (Eq. 2). This covariance has been solved in [14]
taking into account the correlation dependence with the po-
sition. Here, only the solution is shown:
W−1∆ρ˙ = BRxB
T + Rρ˙ , (5)
where Rρ˙ is the covariance of deltarange measurements,
Rx is the covariance of the position solution and B is the
matrix that projects the position solution into the velocity
domain through the line-of-sight vector [14].
Since the different velocity residuals can not be consid-
ered independent as in the case of the pseudoranges, the
classical approach of RAIM can not be directly applied.
Instead in [14], Kelly’s algorithm is used to detect faults in
the presence of correlated errors [15]. A fault is declared
when the maximum of theN individually normalized resid-
uals exceeds the threshold T = Φ−1
(
1− Pfa2N
)
based on
the probability of false alarm.
Fault if: T > max
i∈(1..N)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
wi√(
SW−1∆ρ˙
)
ii
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (6)
where S = I −G (GTW∆ρ˙G)−1 GTW∆ρ˙ projects the
measurement space into the residual space and w = S∆ρ˙
is therefore the vector of residuals.
The protection levels are computed as the sum between
the minimum detectable bias projected in the velocity do-
main (for the worst slope) and the portion of the noise error
that exceeds the integrity risk. For any direction ’x’:
xPL = max
i
(
∣∣∣xslopei ∣∣∣)pbias +K√σ2x , (7)
where K is the inflation factor based on the integrity risk,
σ2x is the variance of the deltaranges projected in the ’x’
direction, pbias is minimum detectable bias computed as
pbias = T + Φ
−1(1− Pmd) [15] and
max
i
(
∣∣∣xslopei ∣∣∣) = max
i
Hxi
√
SW−1∆ρ˙
|Sii|
 , (8)
with H =
(
GTW∆ρ˙G
)−1
GTW∆ρ˙.
3.3 From Protection levels to Covariances
RAIM and Velocity RAIM algorithms provide us with
protection levels that satisfy the required probability of
false alarm (Pfa) and the integrity risk (IR). However, in-
ertial integrity uncertainty is propagated assuming Gaus-
sian distributions through the integration process and needs
therefore the uncertainty of the reset position and velocity
in terms of covariance matrix. In order to adapt the protec-
tion levels (PL) computed by the GNSS algorithms to the
covariances used in the inertial reset, we interpret the PL as
the upper bound of a confidence interval in the three nav-
igation directions (i.e., east-north-up). We consider there-
fore this protection levels as the quantiles at the integrity
risk of a multivariate Gaussian distribution. Hence, we are
able to build the covariance matrix with the deflated pro-
tection levels to the 1-sigma variance in every direction in-
dependently. Our GNSS covariance reset (both for velocity
and position) can be computed as:
PGNSS =
 σ2e 0 00 σ2n 0
0 0 σ2u
 , (9)
where, for example, for the east-west direction:
σe =
EWPL√
2 · erf−1(1− 2 · IR) , (10)
where EWPL is the east-west protection level and erf−1
is the inverse error function. Notice that this covariance
matrix is not the 1-sigma covariance of the GNSS integrity
solution, nevertheless, it is the equivalent covariance that
guarantee the probability of false alarm at the integrity risk
of our application.
4 STRAPDOWN INS UNCERTAINTY PROPAGA-
TION
In an Inertial Navigation System (INS), initial conditions
for position and velocity must be provided so that we can
coast the position of a vehicle. Here, we provide the INS
with velocity and position information as well as their ex-
pected reliability in terms of protection levels at each re-
set. In order to determine this reliability information also
during GNSS gaps, we have to understand how the given
uncertainties are propagated within the inertial strapdown
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Fig. 3 Covariance propagation within the strapdown algo-
rithm assuming given uncertainties of the velocity and po-
sition reset.
algorithm and how the error processes of the inertial mea-
surements affect the system performance.
To analyze the strapdown inertial algorithm from the in-
tegrity point of view, we choose a simplified scenario where
we consider only white noise error in the acceleration mea-
surements with the following assumptions: the earth is con-
sidered flat and not rotating, the correction of the gravity
is perfect and we have perfect information about the air-
plane’s attitude. Under these conditions, we analyze in this
section how the white noise process error in the 3D accel-
erations, the velocity uncertainty reset and the position re-
set uncertainty propagates through the algorithm. While
this might seem to be a very simplified scenario, it is still
very representative since in case we can overbound the ro-
tation corrected accelerations with a Gaussian distribution,
the evolution through the integration steps of the protection
levels still applies as presented in this work.
The error process in the inertial accelerations, the un-
certainty of the GNSS velocity reset and the uncertainty
the GNSS position reset can be seen as three independent
processes since they are generated by three different phys-
ical measurement methods. Hence, their associated uncer-
tainties in terms of covariances can be integrated and prop-
agated independently. In Fig. 3, we can see the existent
covariances at every step. We define Pbw,k as the 3D co-
variance of the white noise in the body frame, Pnw,k is the
covariance of the rotated accelerations (i.e., in the naviga-
tion frame), Pnv0,k is the covariance of the velocity reset
and Pnx0,k is the covariance of the position reset. The total
covariance at the velocity channel is therefore:
Pnv,k = P
n
v0,k + P
n∫
w,k , (11)
where Pn∫
w,k
is the covariance of single integrated white
noise. And the total covariance at the position domain is
expressed as:
Pnx,k = P
n
x0,k + P
n∫
v0,k
+ Pn∫∫w,k , (12)
where Pn∫
v0,k
is the covariance of single integrated veloc-
ity reset and Pn∫∫
w,k
is the covariance of double integrated
white noise.
4.1 White Noise Covariance propagation
In the following, we derive the covariance expression of
the rotated first and double integrated white noise due to
the acceleration errors. In [13, 16] this evolution has been
addressed for a double integrated single axis. Here, we de-
rive those expression for the generalized 3D problem and
we take additionally into account the rotation of the accel-
eration to the navigation frame before integration.
If bw,k is the white process noise at time k, we can ex-
press the rotation and first integration applying backwards
Euler method as:
bn∫w,k = bn∫w,k−1 + ∆tCnb,kbw,k , (13)
assuming bn∫
w,0
= 0. Please notice that Cnb,k is here a de-
terministic rotation matrix that transforms from the body to
the navigation frame ( since we assume the attitude to be
perfectly known) and the time interval between measure-
ments is denoted by ∆t. The latter equation can be more
conveniently expressed in this summation fashion:
bn∫w,k = ∆t
k∑
i=1
Cnb,ibw,i . (14)
We can compute then the covariance of the first inte-
grated white noise as:
Pn∫w,k = E
[
bn∫w,kbnT∫w,k
]
= E
(∆t k∑
i=1
Cnb,ibw,i
)(
∆t
k∑
i′=1
Cnb,i′bw,i′
)T
= E
[
∆t2
k∑
i=1
k∑
i′=1
Cnb,ibw,ib
T
w,i′C
nT
b,i′
]
. (15)
Since the white noise is considered independent at every
time step, all the cross products between the two summa-
tion factors where i 6= i′ are zero, and we can rewrite:
Pn∫w,k = ∆t2
k∑
i=1
Cnb,iE
[
bw,ib
T
w,i
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qw,i
Cn
T
b,i . (16)
The noise covariance Qw is assumed to be a diagonal
matrix since we consider the same noise power for every
axis. Consequently, we can write
E
[
bw,ib
T
w,i
]
= Qw,i = σ
2
w,iI = σ
2
wI ,
and we can thus rewrite the covariance of the first integrated
white noise as:
Pn∫w,k = σ2w∆t2
k∑
i=1
Cnb,iIC
nT
b,i
= σ2wI∆t
2
k∑
i=1
1
= Qw∆t
2k . (17)
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In the latter expression, since Cnb is a rotation matrix, the
following identity has been used:
Cnb,iC
nT
b,i = C
n
b,iC
n−1
b,i = I .
In the same way, we can integrate again the white pro-
cess noise with an Euler formulation as:
bn∫∫w,k = bn∫∫w,k−1 + ∆tbn∫w,k , (18)
or in a summation expression as:
bn∫∫w,k =∆t2
k∑
i=1
i∑
j=1
Cnb,jbw,j
=∆t2
k∑
i=1
(k − i+ 1)Cnb,ibw,i (19)
with bn∫∫
w,0
= bn∫∫
w,1
= 0.
The derivation of the covariance of the rotated and
double integrated white noise can be seen in Equation (20).
Pn∫∫w,k = E
[
bn∫∫w,kbnT∫∫w,k
]
= E
(∆t2 k∑
i=1
(k − i+ 1)Cnb,ibw,i
)(
∆t2
k∑
i′=1
(k − i′ + 1)Cnb,i′bw,i′
)T 
= ∆t4
k∑
i=1
(k − i+ 1)2Cnb,iE
[
bw,ib
T
w,i
]
Cn
T
b,i = Qw∆t
4
k∑
i=1
(k − i+ 1)2 = Qw∆t4
(
1
6
k(k + 1)(2k + 1)
)
. (20)
Here, the simplification for time independence and the
assumption of same noise power for all axis have been also
made.
As we observe from the derived expressions, the single
and the double integrated white-noise do not depend on the
rotation matrices and therefore, they are independent of the
movement of the sensor.
In order to validate the derived equations and covari-
ance evolution we have run Monte-Carlo simulations us-
ing 50.000 random paths. The trajectory of the Monte-
Carlo simulation is displayed in Fig. 4. Here we consider
a constant altitude flight with an initial velocity of 20 m/s
in north direction, the frequency of the measurements is
20 Hz and the assumed noise of the acceleration data has
zero mean and σ = 0.02 m/s2. While turning, we assumed
a constant bank angle of 30 ◦.
Fig. 4 Horizontal flight trajectory of the Monte-Carlo sim-
ulation.
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Fig. 5 Evolution of the standard deviation of the rotated
and single integrated acceleration (i.e., in velocity domain)
in the east direction.
The evolution of the variance in the east direction of rotated
and single integrated white-noise is shown in Fig. 5. Since
there is no cross correlation in the covariance matrix this is
just the square root of the diagonal element. Furthermore,
it coincides also with the results in the other directions.
In Fig. 6, the variance of the double integrated white
noise in the east direction is also shown. We can see how
the empirical variance obtained from the simulated runs
matches the analytical solution.
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Fig. 6 Evolution of the standard deviation of the double
integrated acceleration (i.e., in position domain) in the east
direction.
4.2 Protection Levels Evolution
Using the derived equations of covariance propagation
within the strapdown algorithm, we can determine how the
corresponding protection levels are evolving in our previ-
ous presented scheme (Fig. 3). The final covariance ob-
tained at position domain are converted to protection levels
just by inflating the square root of the diagonal elements for
every direction to fit the required integrity risk. Regarding
the evolution of the final protection levels, three parameters
has to be considered: the variance of the considered white
noise in the accelerations, the protection levels of the veloc-
ity reset and the PL of the position reset. In the following,
we analyze the dependency of the overall protection level
based on these three parameters.
Sensitivity to White Acceleration Noise
The variance of the considered white noise is directly
linked to the quality of the accelerometer. Evidently, this
white noise is very critical to the system performance,
since it is doubled integrated and their covariances grows
quadratically. Please note that this variance assessment is
also applicable in case of a Gaussian error overbound af-
ter the specific force computer (i.e., Gaussian overbound of
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Fig. 7 Position protection level evolution for different vari-
ances of the white noise process on the acceleration. The
GNSS protection levels of the rests are assumed with
velocity PL reset = 2m/s and position PL reset = 10m.
the rotated acceleration).
In Fig. 7, we can see the evolution of the final computed
protection level of one of the axis at the position domain
for different considered qualities of accelerometers, i.e., for
different assumed standard deviations of the white noise
error process in the accelerations.
Sensitivity to Velocity Protection Level Reset
The velocity reset, since it is also integrated, has a big im-
pact in the final protection level in the position. In Fig. 8,
we can see the impact of the uncertainty of the velocity re-
set, where the dependency of the final position PL is plot
for different velocity PL reset.
We can observe the square root shape of the curves for
bigger velocity protection levels, which corresponds to the
shape of a first integrated Gaussian process. For lower
values of velocity PL, where the magnitude is comparable
with the fixed variance of the acceleration white noise, this
latter leads the increment of the final protection level. It can
be also concluded that the velocity PL is a really sensitive
parameter as well, since its value will have a big impact in
the slope of the position PL evolution.
Sensitivity to Position Protection Level Reset
Finally, we analyze the impact of the position reset in the
integrated position PL. In Fig. 9, the evolution of the PL
for different position reset conditions is shown. We ob-
served that over time, the evolution of the PL converges
to an asymptotic slope regardless of the initial position PL
conditions. Although, this may lead to the conclusion that
the position protection level has few impact, this conver-
gence occurs for large values of protection levels, where
most probably the alert limit has been already reached.
From Fig. 7, 8 and 9 we can estimate the maximum
coasting duration until the position protection level is cross-
ing a certain alert limit, for the three critical parameters,
respectively. We also gain a feeling on how sensitive the
overall PL is with respect to the these values.
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Fig. 8 Position protection level evolution for different re-
set protection levels in the velocity domain. Assumption:
White noise variance of σ = 0.02 m/s2 for acceleration
and a position PL reset = 10m.
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Fig. 9 Final protection level evolution for different pro-
tection level reset in the position domain. In this plot:
σ = 0.02m/s2, Velocity PL reset = 2m/s.
5 PROOF OF CONCEPT
In order to demonstrate our concept, we used recorded
GNSS measurements from one of the DLR’s measurement
campaigns at our research airport in Braunschweig, Ger-
many in 2011. The inertial measurements have been sim-
ulated so that they could satisfy the assumptions made in
this work.
We focus here on one of the taxiing maneuvers. The
full maneuver can be seen in Fig. 10. While the plane was
taxiing from its parking position along the taxiway to the
runway, the plane passed alone a nearby hangar. Therefore,
some of the GPS signals were blocked and/or reflected, and
cause multipath effects at the GNSS receiver. As a conse-
quence, GNSS protection level suddenly jumped tremen-
dously for around 100 s. This is depicted in Fig. 11. It
can be seen that both east-west (EWPL) and north-south
(NSPL) protection levels of standalone GPS computed with
RAIM increases over 250 m. On the contrary, our GNSS-
aided INS approach is able to coast not only the position
solution but also the protection levels during the GPS out-
age.
Fig. 10 Taxiing scenario with GPS outage nearby the
hangar
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Fig. 11 Protection level coasting while taxiing during GPS
outage
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have stressed the importance of address-
ing the GNSS/INS integration from the integrity point of
view. Although it is not an easy task to perform a full an-
alytical study of the real uncertainty propagation through
the fusion algorithms, we presented here a simplified sce-
nario where the formal propagation of covariances can be
analytically solved. In particular, we focused our investi-
gations in the strapdown integration steps and have shown
the impact of the measurement noise, as well as the veloc-
ity and position reset information. Since the velocity reset
has a large impact in the PL evolution, efforts should be
invested to improve the velocity RAIM algorithm and to
better characterize its noise level. On the other hand, the
reference position reset is also essential, so further work
should consider ARAIM or GBAS as the GNSS integrity
layer.
The characterization of the inertial error propagation
through the navigation equations presented in this work
still requires some strong assumptions on the inertial mea-
surement equipment. That is we assume the gyroscope as
perfect and only consider white-noise in the accelerations.
More studies of the different error processes presented on
both gyroscopes and accelerometers have to be done. As
this is a complex problem and no analytical solution may
be derived, the solution might consist of overbounding the
inertial errors after the body-to-navigation frame rotation.
If performing this overbound by a Gaussian distribution,
the analysis presented in this paper applies directly.
In this study, the protection levels in the horizontal plane
has been considered independently, i.e., separated in East-
West and North-South. This may lead to a solution where
one of the protection levels is very high compared to the
other. Some further attention should be drawn to the way
these protection levels are compared with the correspond-
ing alert limit, which is currently divided into horizontal
and vertical only. Consequently, the system availability
could be investigated in a more general manner.
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